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Analysis of the Cyber Attacks against ADS-B Perspective of Aviation 
Experts 
Abstract: 
The present paper has a profound literature review of the relation between cyber security, 
aviation and the vulnerabilities prone by the increasing use of information systems in avia-
tion realm. Civil aviation is in the process of evolution of the air traffic management sys-
tem through the introduction of new technologies. Therefore, the modernization of aero-
nautical communications are creating network security issues in aviation that have not 
been mitigated yet. The purpose of this thesis is to make a systematic qualitative analysis 
of the cyber-attacks against Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast. With this 
analysis, the paper combines the knowledge of two fields which are meant to deal together 
with the security issues in aviation. The thesis focuses on the exploitation of the vulner-
abilities of ADS-B and presents an analysis taking into account the perspective of cyber 
security and aviation experts. The threats to ADS-B are depicted, classified and evaluated 
by aviation experts, making use of interviews in order to determine the possible impact, 
and the actions that would follow in case a cyber-attack occurs. The results of the inter-
views show that some attacks do not really represent a real problem for the operators of 
the system and that other attacks may create enough confusion due to their complexity. 
The experience is a determinant factor for the operators of ADS-B, because based on that 
a set of mitigations was proposed by aviation experts that can help to cope in a cyber-
attack situation. This analysis can be used as a reference guide to understand the impact of 
cyber security threats in aviation and the need of the research and aviation communities to 
broaden the knowledge and to increase the level of expertise in order to face the chal-
lenges posed by network security issues. The thesis is in English and contains 58 pages of 
text, 5 chapters, 17 figures, 15 tables. 
Keywords: 
Aviation, Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, Cyber Security, Cyber Attacks 
CERCS: P170 Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control. 
ADS-B süsteemile suunatud küberrünnakute analüüs 
lennundusekspertide seisukohast 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Käesolev töö loob põhjaliku ülevaate lennunduses valitsevatest küberjulgeoleku ohtudest. 
Tsiviillennunduse lennuliiklusteenindus ja õhuseire on üleminekufaasis valmistudes 
kasutusele võtma uue põlvkonna tehnoloogiaid, mis tulevikus asendavad praeguse 
radaripõhise lennukite jälgimissüsteemi uue satelliitpõhise süsteemiga. Lennunduse 
sideteenuste moderniseerimine loob aluse uuetele turvalisusega seotud ohtudele, mille 
võimalikke negatiivseid tagajärgi ei ole suudetud veel maandada. Magistritöö eesmärk on 
koostada kvalitatiivne süstemaatiline analüüs võimalikest küberrünnakutest uue 
satelliitpõhise automaatse sõltuva seire üldsaade (Automatic dependent surveillance-
broadcast –ADS-B) vastu. Analüüs ühendab teadmised küberturvalisuse ja lennunduse 
valdkonnast, mille koos käsitlemine on oluline turvalise tagamise sesiukohalt. Töö 
fokusseerub ADS-B süsteemis esinevatele kitsaskohtadele, mis küberturvalise seisukohalt 
võivad kätkeda ohte või häirida tõsiselt lennuliiklusteeniduse tööd. Potentsiaalsed ohud 
ADS- S süsteemi vastu on kirjeldatud ja liigitatud sõltuvalt ohuastmest. Analüüsi põhiosa 
moodustab lennundus spetsialistide seas läbiviidud küsitlus, mille põhjal on hinnatud ohu 
tõsidust, selle mõju lennundussüsteemile ja milliseid toiminguid on vajalik rakendada ohu 
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esinemise korral. Töö analüüs hindab mõned käsitletud ohtudest ebaoluliseks, mis ei 
kujuta endast märkisväärset probleemi süsteemi operaatoritele. Sellegi poolest esineb 
teatava keerulisuse astmega ohustsenaariumeid, mille tagajärjel on süsteem tugevalt 
häiritud või millega võib kaasneda ulatuslik kahju. Läbiviidud küsitluse põhjal on esitatud 
meetmeid, kuidas maandada võimalikke negatiivseid mõjusid ohuolukorras. Töö 
tulemused on olulised pööramaks tähelepanu lennunduses esinevatele küberohtudele. Töö 
on kirjutatud inglise keeles ja sisaldab 58 lehekülge, 5 peatükki, 17 joonist ja 15 tabelit.  
Võtmesõnad: 
Lennundus, Küberkaitse, Küberrünnakud, Automaatse Sõltuva Seire Üldsaade 
CERCS: P170 Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine 
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1 Introduction 
The development of new technologies have brought about concerns related with the safety 
of industrial aviation due to the vulnerabilities embedded in information systems [1]. The 
main objective of all the studies and research in process is to create state of the art tech-
nologies to enhance the communications, navigation and surveillance in order to provide 
pilots and air traffic controllers with timely information for the decision-making. 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has made a huge effort in order to 
provide an appropriate set-up to allow Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) 
based on the Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) to meet the requirements for a reliable aircraft-
to-aircraft and aircraft-to-ground communications[2]. With the enhancement of the com-
munication in aeronautical networks, the interdependency of the systems involved poses 
more security issues [1]. One of the applications used for air traffic surveillance is the 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), which has vulnerabilities by de-
sign and its possible impact in airworthiness is not clear. [3] 
Indeed, it is important to understand that the networks and nodes in aviation are not simi-
lar to a ground-based network of computer devices [4]. ATN is an Ad-Hoc wireless net-
work that has a large number of mobile nodes, and this mobility becomes in the weakest 
point in the chain that the adversary might exploit in order to compromise the applications 
used in the communication [5]. 
The increasing involvement of computer science in aviation has caused the increment of a 
variety of vulnerabilities that might be exploited with different objectives in mind by cyber 
criminals. Moreover, there are relevant factors to comprehend the risk of a cyber-attack in 
aviation such as awareness, preparation, the impact in aeronautical operations, and the 
possible reactions of pilots and air traffic controllers in a hypothetical attack situation. Al-
though some technology developments enhance information security, threat detection and 
network security in the aeronautical environment, it is completely clear that human deci-
sions based on previous knowledge and abilities are still needed to cope in critical situa-
tions [6]. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the exploitation of ADS-B vulnerabilities and its 
impact in aeronautical operations. The review of the literature is grounded on the aca-
demic knowledge and research in aviation and cyber security fields. The study gathers 
essential information and a systematic qualitative analysis is made in order to understand 
how the aviation experts would proceed in a cyber-attack situation and which tools and 
procedures can be used to cope in a critical situation. 
Furthermore, the study involves the author personal experience in military aviation field, 
which contributes to perform the analysis. To the best of the author knowledge, there is 
not any study which aims to analyze the possible effects of cyber-attacks against ADS-B 
and to determine the possible ways that aviation professionals would proceed in a cyber-
attack situation. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The objective of ICAO is to implement ADS-B in every airplane in the world by 2020. 
With the full implementation of ADS-B, Secondary Radar Surveillance (SSR) will be use-
less and Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) might be used as a complement [7]. Aviation 
national organizations are claiming that the data fusion between PSR and ADS-B will take 
place, but at the same time they allude the discontinuation of PSR and SSR when ADS-B 
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is fully implemented [8], [9]. The system was designed without security measures and its 
vulnerabilities have not been addressed and mitigated completely [10].  
There is no common vision, standards or strategy defining cyber security in aviation [11]. 
Consequently, this fact draws the attention to the lack of knowledge and awareness that 
pilots and air traffic controllers have about the vulnerabilities and possible effects of a po-
tential attack [12],[13]. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze the possible impact that the 
cyber-attacks against ADS-B can cause to aviation system. Pilots and air traffic controllers 
take important decisions based on the instruments they have in the cockpit and air traffic 
control respectively, and wrong decisions might have undesirable effects on aviation.  
Main issues addressed by this thesis are: 
1 Exploitation of the vulnerabilities of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast. 
2 Lack of understanding of security and safety risks prone by the vulnerabilities that 
might be exploited in a cyber-attack against ADS-B system. 
3 Lack of understanding of the real issues that cyber-attacks against ADS-B could cause 
to pilots and air traffic controllers. 
Research Questions: The primary questions that this study sought to answer are:  
1 How does the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of ADS-B might confuse air traffic 
controllers and pilots to lead to a critical situation?  
2 Which cyber-attacks against ADS-B can cause a major impact in aviation? 
3 Which current procedures might be used by pilots and air traffic controllers to deal 
with the cyber-attacks against ADS-B? 
1.2 Contribution of the Author 
The contribution of this thesis is the analysis of the impact in aviation caused by the cyber-
attacks which might affect to ADS-B. This analysis provides a better understanding of the 
effects in aeronautical operations and the procedures that aviation personnel might use in 
order to deal with a cyber-attack situation. 
1.3 Thesis Limitations 
The first limitation imposed to the development of this thesis is the restricted access to 
aviation documents. The description of the function and security vulnerabilities of ADS-B 
system are not publicly available due to the high level of confidentiality of the infor-
mation. 
The second limitation that the thesis faced is the amount of information the experts in 
aviation are allowed to disclose. The implementation of ADS-B is in process and that lim-
its the number of authorized aviation personnel who have operated the system. The per-
sonnel contacted for the research were from aviation civil organizations of Colombia and 
Estonia, TESDA Research group and Colombian Air Force. 
The third limitation is the legal restriction to perform a real attack in order to evaluate em-
pirically the effects in aviation system. Despite of all the limitations posed to continue 
with the research, it was considered that the gaps could be filled with advisory and feed-
back received by aviation experts. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The goal of the thesis is to make a qualitative analysis of cyber threats, which might affect 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast system in aviation, and to analyze how they 
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might affect to air traffic controllers, pilots and aviation safety based on the knowledge 
and perception of the aviation experts. The paper is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 1. Introduction – gives a general explanation of the topic and the purpose 
of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2. Literature Review – defines the two fields of the research, Aviation and 
Cyber Security, the vulnerabilities and exploitation of ADS-B system and defines 
the scope of this thesis. 
 Chapter 3. Methodology – describes the methods used to make the qualitative 
analysis of the cyber-attacks against Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
and the evaluation of the impact in aviation. 
 Chapter 4. Findings and Analysis – this chapter provides the analysis of the cyber-
attacks against ADS-B, the proposed mitigations for the attacks and the analysis of 
the impact in aviation given by aviation experts.  
 Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations – this chapter provides additional 
discussion in regards of the results and recommendations. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Aviation 
Aeronautical transportation has been constantly developing from the outset in 1903 when 
the Wright Brothers made the first flight in history and it has not stopped its evolution yet. 
Nowadays, aviation is not only seen as the safest means of transportation [14] but it also 
has become in part of the critical infrastructure of many countries that have clearly estab-
lished its protection, for instance United States which issued the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 for this purpose [15]. The importance of commercial aviation is 
not only focused on the transportation of great amount of passengers and goods but also it 
is key in the maintenance of the economy [16].  
More than one hundred years of history with failures and accomplishments have turned 
aviation into the powerful set of state of the art technologies, high qualified personnel and 
safety environment that nowadays is essential for the life of many people in the world. 
According to Delloite [17] by 1919 it was already needed the application of rules to con-
trol the air traffic and the solution to this problem was the creation of the International 
Commission for Air Navigation. 
The number of airplanes in the sky increased even more when the aircrafts were used for 
commercial purposes, like in North America to deliver the mail by the U.S. Postal De-
partment. The development increased even more with the rush to have better airplanes for 
combat during the time of the First World War. It was not only the need to improve tech-
nology in the aircraft, but also the intrinsic requirement to control the air space [18]. 
Because of the improvements in technology and increased number of aircrafts, the air traf-
fic control began to be more precise in the decade of 1930 when the air traffic controllers 
did not have the need to use archaic methods to safely separate aircrafts [18]. New devices 
were introduced such as beacons, radios and gun lights in order to improve the problems 
experimented by pilots in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), but these im-
provements were not completely accurate [19]. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War and with all the developments reached during 
this time, one of the most important progress in aviation was made with the creation of the 
radar system. This system equipped air traffic controllers with the ability to watch the 
movements of any plane that is in the range of the radar [17]. The increased necessity to 
install navigation systems in the aircrafts to help the pilots to fly in the right direction and 
to help them to land in adverse meteorological conditions brought about the introduction 
of radio navigation technologies such as Low Frequency Radio (LFR), Non-Directional 
Beacon (NDB), Very High Omnidirectional Range (VOR) and Distance Measuring 
Equipment (DME) [20]. 
After the 1960 decade, many new systems have been produced and new standardized pro-
cedures in manuals and approach charts were established to give pilots and air traffic con-
trollers more accurate information to aid in navigation in order to execute a safe landing. 
Modern systems and concepts like the Instrument Landing System (ILS), Microwave 
Landing System (MLS), Area Navigation RNAV and Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) were introduced to provide more efficient paths to follow to save time and fuel 
and to supply accuracy in flight procedures [18]. 
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2.2 Aviation and Computer Science  
The revolution of the computer science could not be out of the way of aviation technology 
and with this the possibility to store, transmit and display digital information for the opera-
tors [19]. ICAO has already defined the concept of Cyber Security in Aviation in the doc-
ument 9985. In specific terms, Cyber Security in Aviation was defined as follows: “refers 
to all matters pertaining to the security of information and communication systems, tech-
nology or applications of all kinds. This includes analogue or digital devices, and encom-
passes radio, telecommunications, computer and network hardware and software, data 
storage systems and devices, satellite systems, surveillance systems, navigation systems, as 
well as the various services and applications associated with them”[13],[21]. 
Information systems are increasing their role in aviation using cyber-physical elements to 
process and display data used by operators [22]. Today, these information systems are 
providing new capabilities that aim to improve the services, enhance processes and to in-
crease the interconnection of aeronautical network devices [23]. There are new technolo-
gies and modernizations that are posing a new paradigm in terms of cyber security. 
Many of these innovations have been made to support aircraft systems, for instance fly-by-
wireless components, In Flight Entertainment (IFE) for passengers, air traffic management 
based on GPS reports and the communication between pilots and air traffic controllers 
through data link satellite-based systems. These enhancements have physical components 
that completely rely on aeronautical information systems in order to operate properly [24].  
Furthermore, other transitions such as the increasing use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) software, Field Loadable Software (FLS) and the creation of the concept of au-
tonomous flight for e-enabled aircrafts have facilitated air traffic management while low-
ering the maintenance and costs, but they are not meeting the security compatibility re-
quired to guarantee the standards of civil aviation [25]. In addition, the integration with 
aircraft and off-board systems has started to become closer than ever, creating cyber phys-
ical security considerations [26]. 
When it comes to think that an accident might be caused through cyber means, the current 
belief of that possibility is hardly considered. It is completely clear that most of accidents 
occurred in aviation have been caused due to human factor [27] -[29] and the known cyber 
security incidents in aviation have not caused any major impact in the safety of passengers 
and aircrafts as shown on Table 1. However, this list only shows the known cyber-
incidents and it does not mean that the list is complete. Since there could be an unknown 
number of cyber incidents, which have not been disclosed to the public yet. 
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that these cyber incidents do not really demonstrate 
the dangerous effect that actually they might cause [13], and because of these rising con-
cerns, the credibility in aviation safety could be at risk. Some potential vulnerabilities have 
been disclosed by aeronautical organizations, hackers community and media as it can be 
evidenced on Table 2. 
The evolution of information technology has reached aviation at any level. From the im-
provement of the surveillance, navigation and communication systems to the applications 
used by pilots to receive, store and display relevant aeronautical information, which is 
used for the decision-making in the cockpit. In spite of the FAA has approved in 2012 the 
use of many aeronautical applications in the Electronic Flight Bags [35], it has been 
demonstrated that since the software of those applications are not tested with the reliability 
standards used for built-in cockpit devices [36], they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks which 
might mislead the judgement of the pilots. 
13 
 
Finally, the Federal Aviation Administration in United States and EUROCONTROL in 
Europe are implementing NextGen and SESAR programs respectively, to modernize air 
traffic management and to improve the data link communications. Moreover, ICAO is 
supporting the implementation of similar programs all around the world in an attempt to 
standardize aviation [9]. These programs use advances in digital information technologies 
to increase the security, safety, operational efficiency, capacity and to lower costs and 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions with the new regulations and technologies [17]. 
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast system is an essential part of these pro-
grams, providing not only more accurate surveillance information than radars, but also it is 
expected to produce benefits such as capacity, safety and efficiency for aeronautical opera-
tions [42]. Nevertheless, these implementations pose new cyber security vulnerabilities to 
aviation due to the increased interconnectivity, integration and the interoperability of the 
involved systems [43]. 
Table 1. Aviation Cyber Security Incidents. 
YEAR DESCRIPTION 
1997 
A hacker broke into a Bell Atlantic computer system causing that the 
Federal Aviation Administration control tower and the runway lights 
transmitter were shut down [30],[31]. 
2006 
A virus spread into the air traffic control systems of the Federal 
Aviation Administration caused that a part of the air traffic control 
systems were shut down in Alaska[30]. 
2007 
A virus was loaded into Thai Airways Electronic Flight Bags. The 
virus disabled the EFBs and it was spread to other electronic flight 
bags [30].  
2008 
800 cyber incident alerts were detected at air traffic control facilities 
and over 150 incidents have not been solved yet [30].  
2009 
A server of the Federal Aviation Administration was compromised and 
48,000 employee social security numbers were disclosed [30]. 
2009 
A truck driver carrying a Global Positioning System (GPS) jammer 
unintentionally caused outages to Newark Liberty International 
Airport’s ground-based augmentation system (GBAS)[32].  
2011 
A group of software engineers was accused of disrupting operations at 
a new airport. There was a sabotage in the program code which caused 
that the check-in services failed and delayed  a considerable amount of 
flights in many airports [33]. 
2014 
Many aircrafts were vanished from the radar screens in Austria, 
Germany, Czech Republic and Slovakia. It was brought about by 
alleged military warfare exercises [34].  
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2.3 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
The aviation surveillance has been governed for the last six decades by radars. Old legacy 
radar systems have been the devices which air traffic controllers and pilots have trusted in 
to support their decisions when it comes to have a better traffic flow to any airport in the 
world. Currently, the radars are still the main system on which the air traffic control is 
used for aircraft surveillance [44]. 
The radar systems are categorized in two different types: Primary Surveillance Radar and 
Secondary Surveillance Radar. Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) works sending signals 
that are evaluated according to the time elapsed from the signal is sent until the time signal 
is received again to the antenna after reflection on the aircraft [45]. This system is inde-
pendent since it does not need of any additional device on the aircraft, it only provides 
position and it does not provide altitude nor identity [46]. The other type of radar opera-
tion is Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), which is a dependent system that sends inter-
rogation signals to the aircraft. A built in device located in the aircraft called transponder 
responds to the request signals. The system is able to provide range, bearing, identity and 
altitude [47].  
Table 2. Potential Vulnerabilities Found in Aviation. 
YEAR DESCRIPTION 
2008 
The FAA stated that the proposed architecture of the Boeing 787 allows 
new kinds of passenger connectivity to previously isolated data net-
works, which are connected to systems that perform operations needed 
for the safety of the aircraft [37].  
2010 
The FAA published a notice indicating that some computer systems on 
the Boeing 747-8 and 747-8F may be vulnerable to outside attacks due 
to the nature of their connectivity [38]. 
2012 
Andrei Costin demonstrated a weakness in the air traffic control. With 
low cost commercial hardware and software it was possible to spoof 
ADS-B signals to inject a ghost aircraft into ground control display 
[10],[33]. 
2012 
Hacker demonstrated theoretically the possibility to use an Android to 
remotely attack and hijack an airplane [39].   
2012 
A potential vulnerability in Electronic Flight Bags programming could 
corrupt with malicious intentions when the devices are connected to 
external networks to receive updates [33] 
2014 
Security expert allegedly told that he was able to hack and to steer air-
liner mid-flight breaking into the In Flight Entertainment [40].  
2015 
WestJet aircraft was allegedly transmitting 7500 code, which indicates a 
hijacking. It was possibly a modification through cyber means [41] 
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One of the main issues with radar systems is that they do not provide the required preci-
sion and do not have the detection accuracy for the growing air traffic flow [48]. As a so-
lution to this problem, the implementation of ADS-B is in process. The Automatic De-
pendent Surveillance-Broadcast is the next generation system that is planned to replace the 
old standing radar systems [50]. The main purpose of ADS-B is to make use of Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and Radio Frequency (RF) data link to broadcast twice per se-
cond the aircraft information to airborne and ground receivers, instead of just responding 
to interrogations as it is standardized with radars [44].  
The source of position information is provided by GPS system. The aircrafts have a trans-
mitter, receiver and a processing device, which receives information from the GPS, and 
the Flight Management System (FMS) to provide an image to the pilot on the cockpit dis-
play. The FMS gives information about the flight plan, ensures the correct trajectory of the 
aircraft [49], and automates procedures when the aircraft is airborne. Moreover, the GPS 
sensors and FMS provide information to the transmitter to broadcast surveillance data to 
the other aircrafts and to the ground stations. The ground station executes the same process 
to display the information on the respective screen and, thereafter to broadcast the air traf-
fic information [7]. The composition of ADS-B and its subsystems can be observed in 
Figure 1.  
The purpose of ADS-B is to enhance capabilities of surveillance in every phase of the 
flight from the engine start until the shutdown, which means that even the movements on 
the ground during taxi and every airborne phase will be supported by ADS-B [50]. The 
onboard ADS-B system calculates the aircraft data using the GPS sensors and then the 
calculated data is combined with identification information to be broadcast through the 
ADS-B OUT subsystem [7].  
 
Figure 1. Main Components of ADS-B [7]. 
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Afterwards the ADS-B ground stations, which are in the range, receive the signals and 
transmit the messages making use of the network backbone until they reach the ground 
control station [7] and the broadcast also reaches the nearby airplanes making use of the 
ADS-B IN subsystem [44]. Figure 2 provides an ADS-B functional diagram to understand 
the operation of ADS-B OUT and ADS-B IN subsystems and the interaction among air-
crafts and ground stations. 
With ADS-B, the information transmitted is processed by the aircrafts and ground stations 
so that the receivers can have a four-dimension trajectory to improve decision-making of 
pilots and air traffic controllers [50]. The messages transmitted by ADS-B contain the next 
information: aircraft identification, urgency code, intent and uncertainty level [52]. ADS-B 
is categorized as automatic since it does not require any input from the pilot or air traffic 
controller. It is dependent because the aircraft needs the GNSS in order to derive its loca-
tion and it needs a transmitter in the aircraft to broadcast the messages [7]. Moreover, the 
accuracy is improved with ADS-B over the radars allowing to reduce the standard separa-
tion of aircrafts and to reduce time and consumption of fuel in flight procedures [53]. The 
Extended Squitter 1090ES in the 1090 MHz frequency and the Universal Access Trans-
ceiver (UAT) are the two data links which support ADS-B to enhance interoperability, 
regulatory and legacy purposes [10].  
The design of ADS-B enhances the air traffic management by improving the situational 
awareness for the air traffic controllers on the surface while controlling aircrafts executing 
taxiing. It also enables greater agility to prevent mid-air collisions and is the perfect solu-
tion for areas where the use of radar systems is not possible like in Gulf of Mexico or 
where radars are not completely reliable like in Alaska due to the rugged terrain [7].  
Furthermore, an additional improved characteristic is that the precision of ADS-B is not 
deteriorated with the distance and it maintains an accuracy of 20 meters that is significant-
ly better than radar, which in 60 nautical miles is deteriorated to 300 meters of difference 
[53]. The complete implementation of ADS-B will allow the reduction separation between 
aircrafts in order to increase the capacity of the control for the airspace [50]. 
 
Figure 2. ADS-B Functional Diagram [51]. 
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2.3.1 Vulnerabilities of ADS-B  
The analysis of the vulnerabilities has to be executed in a way so that the most sensible 
components of the system can be included. The critical components of ADS-B are GPS, 
ADS-B transmitter, the data link medium and the ground systems for the air traffic control 
center [53]. 
A security assessment evaluates the vulnerabilities of a system based on the ability of the 
system to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data [7]. In the case 
of ADS-B the loss of confidentiality must be determined as completely obvious since the 
principle of the system is to openly broadcast the information constantly at a rate of 2HZ 
[54]. Although the information is available to anyone who has a proper ADS-B receiver, 
due to the lack of encryption on ADS-B [7], it has to be taken into account that many of 
the aviation services are required to be openly broadcast for safety and information pur-
poses. For instance, some of these broadcast services are the Very High Frequency (VHF) 
radio signals, meteorological information for pilots such as Traffic Information Service 
Broadcast (TIS-B) and Traffic Information Service Broadcast (FIS-B) which provide rele-
vant information of the traffic and meteorological conditions. 
The real problem arises due to the sensible information transmitted through ADS-B about 
the aircrafts and the possible malicious purposes that this information might be used for 
[7]. In comparison to Primary Surveillance Radar and Secondary Surveillance Radar PSR 
and SSR signals which are more difficult to intercept and require a high level of ability to 
obtain the same data. Hence, the dependency of ADS-B on wireless networks, GPS and 
the use of a low-power signal makes it more prone to security issues than radar systems 
[55]. 
The integrity of ADS-B might be affected due to the ability that the system has to share 
messages with any two different devices [56]. The purpose of ADS-B message is to 
transmit information not only to ground stations but also to aircrafts; hence, the messages 
might be intercepted and modified. As a result of this vulnerability it can be confirmed the 
lack of authentication of the system [52]. As the Figure 3 shows, ADS-B has a Cyclic Re-
dundancy Code (CRC) in the format of the message which is used for data integrity [54], 
although this is not enough to guarantee the integrity of the message from the cyber securi-
ty perspective. It has been experimentally demonstrated by Schäfer et al. [57] and Costin 
et al. [10], the methods to guarantee that the CRC does not produce any kind of error 
which can make the system to disregard the message. Therefore, the susceptibility of re-
ceiving false messages and the deletion of the messages prompts a significant concern 
[58].  
Finally, the availability of the system lies on the possibility that the system might not be 
disrupted by external intentional or unintentional actions. The susceptibility to jamming 
not only to GPS signals but also to the extended squitter 1090 MHz channel creates the 
threat to disrupt the communications and create denial of the service for a determined pe-
riod of time [53]. The effect of a GPS jamming could be even more chaotic if the action is 
executed in different locations at the same time, entailing the disruption of GPS based sur-
 
Figure 2. ADS-B Extended Squitter Format [7]. 
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veillance system used by aircrafts and airports. In addition, attackers have the capability to 
transmit an unmanageable amount of messages in order to saturate the channel. This satu-
ration is directed to the system data processing of the ground station and poses the threat 
of totally disable the functionality of the ground station [58]. 
2.3.2 Exploitation of ADS-B Vulnerabilities 
To exploit the vulnerabilities of ADS-B a variety of attacks have been identified. The at-
tacks can affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system. However, these 
attacks are the result of coordinated established steps in the process to achieve the final 
goal of the attack. The next attack techniques were categorized in [7], [57], [59]to better 
understand more complex attacks against ADS-B system:  
Interception of ADS-B OUT: the technique is called as aircraft reconnaissance [7] or 
simply eavesdropping. The acquisition of any ADS-B commercially available receiver and 
the proper set-up of the COTS to decode the messages in the right format is enough to 
perform the attack. For a better understanding of the interception of ADS-B messages, it 
will be described two examples of current public available means to execute it:  
1. Radarcape and Mode S beast: Günter Köllner offers on his website an ADS-B pas-
sive receiver. The device contains a Linux computer with a network interface to con-
nect to any required network [60]. Furthermore, the device has a built-in software with 
a web interface that offers the possibility to be configured by any inexpert user. In cer-
tain cases the users do not have the software, however in the public market exists the 
open-software package GNU Radio, which has been used in [10], [49]to execute the 
interception of ADS-B OUT and additional attacks. 
2. Kinetic Avionics SBS-3 with Flightaware: The Company Kinetic Avionics Products 
offers the SBS-3, which is an ADS-B receiver of the 1090 MHz channel [62]. 
Flightaware offers the capacity and the instructions to use the hardware with the web-
site in order to track the airplanes transmitting ADS-B signals without running a spe-
cific computer application [63]. 
 
Figure 3. Open source track of a commercial airplane from www.flightradar24.com. 
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Moreover, the information can also be obtained from publicly available websites such as 
www.flightradar24.com, www.radarvirtuel.com and www.flightaware.com as it can be 
evidenced in Figure 4.  
The visible data in publicly open websites (see also Figure. 4) are: airline company, 24 bit 
ICAO identification number, registration, type of aircraft, itinerary, departure time, esti-
mated time of arrival, flight time, delay in flight and departure, mode-S code, True Air 
Speed (TAS), Ground Speed (GS), calibrated altitude, vertical speed, track, specific cur-
rent coordinates of the aircraft and flight radar receiver. 
Jamming: The execution of jamming disables one of various nodes in the wireless net-
work from sending or receiving messages with enough power to disrupt 1090MHz fre-
quency [59]. Performing the technique does not need a high level of expertise and it has 
been demonstrated that it might affect messages that have been already sent in wireless 
networks [64]. 
Message Injection: This technique takes advantage of the ease to exploit the lack of au-
thentication of the system. The attacker must implement a proper transmitter and to modu-
late the message in the correct message format [59]. The technical steps for implementa-
tion are based on using a system comprised of a GNU Radio, a Universal Software Radio 
Peripheral (USRP) [49]. The software can be developed by the attacker, which might be 
by writing a native C or C++ based GNU Radio modulator and encoder, or to execute the 
encoding and modulation in a specific software such as MatLab [10]. The ADS-B receiv-
ers have omnidirectional antennas that cannot discriminate the direction of the received 
messages; therefore, it is not possible for the system to determine the location of the pos-
sible attacker [57]. Some attacks require the injection of multiple messages. The additional 
requirement for multiple injections is a high level of bandwidth of the channel according 
to the number of messages to be injected [57]. 
Message Deletion: This attack is executed mainly by means of interference to delete mes-
sages from the wireless network [59]. The constructive interference is the preferable 
method to execute the attack, since it requires less strict synchronization than the destruc-
tive interference [57]. The attack has a level of difficulty if the attacker wants to delete 
selected messages. As a requirement the attacker must to eavesdrop the channel of 1090 
MHz extended squitter and to create the interference with the message that he wants to 
delete prior it reaches the ground station [57]. In addition, the 1090 extended squitter 
Mode S checksum has the ability to correct at most 5 bit errors per message, the message 
cannot exceed this limit in order to be valid [59]. 
Message Modification: The integrity of the message is affected with the modification of 
the information contained in the message. The technique might be performed by two 
means, overshadowing and bit-flipping [59]. The preferable way to modify the message is 
to overshadow the signal since it is easier for the attacker to decode the message without 
error [57]. The message is modified during the transmission and the attacker must locate 
himself at a correct position and angle to the aircraft, plus to calculate the precise timing to 
inject the modified message [57].  
For a better understanding of the reader the figure 5 provides the hardware set-up estab-
lished in [57] to execute their experiment. This figure shows the device used to play the 
role as attacker in the case of the Linux computer and the Windows computer plays the 
role as the receiver, which can be an aircraft or an air traffic control facility. This set-up 
demonstrates that the resources needed to execute every kind of attack to any ADS-B re-
ceiver is utmost 2500 dollars [57]. 
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2.3.3 Exploitation of GPS vulnerabilities 
An important concern is the inherent reliance of ADS-B on GPS. GPS signals are vital to 
the whole operation of the system and accuracy of the information received by the opera-
tors [65]. The different vulnerabilities that might affect GPS might be divided into inten-
tional, unintentional and human factor problems [66]. The unintentional vulnerabilities 
and hazards that might be brought about by the environment and nature such as earth-
quakes, floods, solar cosmic radiation and space objects that might affect the GPS ground 
stations and data links [67]. The unintentional human interference must be considered 
since it could cause a huge problem to an air traffic control facility. An example of this 
was the interference generated in Newark airport in New Jersey, which caused many trou-
bles to the air traffic center, by a truck driver who used a cheap and easy to obtain jammer 
to disrupt the signals of the GPS device used to track the vehicle [68]. 
The vulnerabilities of GPS systems do not only represent a problem for the surveillance 
systems. There must be cyber security considerations regarding the possibility that an 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) can be spoofed through the transmission of false infor-
mation using GPS signals [69]. In addition in [69], it is analyzed the vulnerabilities of the 
current autopilot system of the UAV and the behavior of the system after the attack in or-
der to promote the development of improved design of autopilot system resilient to cyber-
attacks. Therefore, the vulnerabilities of GPS might also affect the data transmitted to the 
aircraft through data link that finally reaches the Flight Management System (FMS), 
which uses GPS sensors to automate in-flight procedures.  
Figure 4. Experimental Hardware Set-Up to Perform Attacks Against ADS-B[57]. 
21 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
The research design used for this thesis is a qualitative analysis to determine the possible 
impact of the threats (see section 2.3.2) that might affect Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance Broadcast in the aviation system and the tools that can be used by air traffic 
controllers and pilots to deal with the attacks. The research is based on official documents 
of aviation, academic papers about cyber-attacks against ADS-B, hackers’ community 
publications, aviation safety assessment and interviews with the experts in the field.  
3.2 Qualitative Analysis Procedure 
The attacks that have been object of experiments in the science realm were identified in 
order to consider only those that are the real concern to be executed against the system. 
The taxonomy described by McCallie [7] is used to systematically classify the attacks. 
Moreover, in order to take into account that security risk implies safety risk in aviation 
[70], the impact of the attacks is assessed with aviation safety considerations. This section 
describes the steps followed to make the qualitative analysis, to determine the impact of 
the cyber-attacks and to obtain the results.  
1. Determine the Impact on Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability: The effects 
caused by each kind of attack are determined according to the effect caused in 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system, which are described in the “Guid-
ance Material: Security Issues Associated with ADS-B” issued by ICAO [58], and the 
effect caused in pilots and air traffic controllers with the operation of the system. Any kind 
of damage or impact caused to the assets will affect the operation of the system. It will 
probably cause the deterioration in the communication between air traffic controllers and 
pilots and safety concerns for the aeronautical operations. The assets identified in the 
ADS-B wireless network are confidentiality of the information transmitted through ADS-
B channel, integrity of the information transmitted with the ADS-B messages and the 
availability of the ADS-B communications.  
2. Identification of Attack Targets: The targets can be categorized in three according to 
Mahmoud [70]: ground segment, which refers to the ground networks of ADS-B including 
the data link ground stations such as ADS-B ground stations, the distributed computer 
network and the ground control station of the air traffic controllers. The second target is 
the air segment which is compounded by the ADS-B system that is onboard the aircraft 
and finally the air-ground segment that comprises the communication medium used to 
broadcast the data. The targets are identified according to the effects that the attacks cause 
to the end users, which in the case of ADS-B are the pilots and the air traffic controllers, 
because they are the direct operators of the system. 
3. Classification of Attack Techniques: Every attack is executed with specific methods. 
Although the method used by any attacker might be different, in general terms they can be 
categorized in interception of ADS-B OUT signals, jamming [7], message injection, 
message deletion and message modification [57]. 
4. Classification of the technical difficulty of attack: The level of difficulty helps to 
perform a risk analysis of the attacks. The levels are categorized according to McCallie 
[71] description of the technical expertise, knowledge and additional implementation 
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required to execute an attack. The level of difficulty are classified in Low, Medium or 
High. 
5. Development of Attack Trees: The concept of attack tree was first established by 
Schneier [72] in his book “Secrets and lies: digital security in a networked world”. Attack 
trees have a common relation with fault trees. Fault trees have been used in order to check 
the safety, performance and interoperability requirements of ADS-B [73]. Attack trees 
provide a means to evaluate the risk of an attack making use of the capabilities of fault 
trees but also taking into consideration the adversary willing to attack [74].  
The attack tree can be developed with AND and OR nodes. The nodes represent different 
steps in order to execute the final goal. In addition, all the the children nodes of an AND 
node have to be achieved to get to the final goal. OR nodes do not require that all children 
nodes have to be achieved, with only one node is enough to be satisfied [72]. The attack 
trees were developed based on the literature review to understand the technical steps that 
an attacker must to carry out to achieve the final objective. However, in the phase of this 
research there is not a solid foundation to provide a quantitative analysis. They were not 
set any metrics to the nodes of the attack trees in that there was not available data to do it 
and to perform further validation. 
6. Evaluation of Impact: To make a systematic qualitative analysis of the possible 
consequences of every attack, the impact of the attacks can be assessed based on the 
amended OSA ED78A/DO264 classification matrix [73]. Taking into consideration the 
perspective of aviation experts, this matrix provides a systematic approach to analyze the 
impact in the aeronautical operations brought about by the cyber-attacks. Figure 6 
represents the rating from 1-5 with 1 being the most severe and 5 rates as least severe.  
The severity of impact of each attack was discussed with experts in the field of aviation in 
the Colombian Air Force and civil aviation organizations of Colombia and Estonia. The 
importance of this classification is that provides information of the possible conditions that 
an attack might produce in the ATC and in the flight crew. 
3.3 Interviews and Data Analysis 
The type of interview was semi-structured (See Appendix 2 and 3) in that to allow the 
interviewer to ask additional questions, which might provide relevant information about 
the topic in study. An interview guide was used, explanation of the purpose and topic of 
the interview and specific questions to be asked. This kind of interview provides more 
profound information, which cannot be achieved with a standardized multiple-choice 
questionnaire, and gives the possibility to get more honest responses [75]. Similar studies 
have been recently realized using survey-based analysis in the aviation domain by 
Strohmeier, et al. [76]and Silva, et al. [77], but it was considered that a survey does not 
provide the advantages that only one-to-one interview gives to obtain more valuable data 
[75]. 
The main objective of the interview was to obtain the most relevant information from the 
participants regarding the predicted reactions in a cyber-attack against ADS-B surveillance 
system, the most critical situations that could be caused and the best mitigations that might 
be executed based on their experience. It is important to highlight that ADS-B is still in 
process of implementation, and it allowed analyzing the preparation that aviation 
personnel have to deal with the vulnerabilities of the system. The analysis of the 
interviews and notes were compared and categorized to answer the research questions of 
this thesis. 
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3.3.1 Selection of the Aviation Experts 
The selection of the professionals of aviation was determinant to obtain the required 
knowledge. Therefore, the people selected were only related with piloting, air traffic 
control and Air Traffic Management (ATM) experts. The interviewees were selected 
according to their experience in their specific aviation discipline (See Appendix 1), 
expertise in aviation realm, and the operational usage they have with ADS-B. It is 
important to highlight that not all the pilots and air traffic controllers have used the system 
worldwide, but this research sought to interview those who have already operated ADS-B. 
Although the participants were from two different geographical locations, that added value 
and different perspectives of the issue. 
 
Figure 6. Severity of the impact of the attacks on ADS-B vulnerabilities [73]. 
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4 Findings and Analysis 
4.1 Qualitative analysis of cyber-attacks against ADS-B 
The attacks contemplated in this thesis are those, which have been experimentally proven 
in an enclosed laboratory in [10], [57], [49], and which represent the real concern. These 
attacks named in Table 3 are the threats for the assets identified in ADS-B system. In the 
next sections, the analysis of each cyber-attack against ADS-B is performed following the 
procedure described in chapter 3. 
During the interviews, every attack was thoroughly described and explained to the partici-
pants, since the majority of the interviewees did not have previous knowledge about the 
vulnerabilities of ADS-B. Furthermore, it was noticed that despite the disparate geograph-
ical locations of the participants, the responses showed a similar pattern in the procedures 
and possible reactions to the attacks. 
4.1.1 Aircraft Reconnaissance 
Aircraft Reconnaissance is known as eavesdropping. Any attacker executes it in order to 
carry out further attacks [78]. This attack is based on the interceptions of the ADS-B OUT 
signals and the correct decoding and demodulation using a proper set-up of open source 
software and hardware, which can be easily accessible in the commercial market [10], 
[57].  
Table 3. Attacks and Affected Assets of ADS-B. 
THREATS AFFECTED ASSETS 
Attacks Confidentiality Integrity  Availability 
Aircraft Reconnaissance X 
  Aircraft Target Ghost Inject X X X 
Ground Station Target Ghost Inject  
 
X 
 Ground Station Multiple Ghost Inject X X 
Replay Attack X X 
 Aircraft Spoofing X X 
 Virtual Trajectory Modification X X 
 Aircraft Disappearance X X X 
False Alarm Attack X X 
 Aircraft Flood Denial 
  
X 
Ground Station Flood Denial 
  
X 
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The open source websites such as flightradar24 (www.flightradar24.com) are not com-
pletely reliable to perform aircraft reconnaissance, and the main reason is that this kind of 
organizations eliminate the information of the website according to the requirements re-
ceived by aviation companies or governmental organizations. For example in 2014, the 
information of the airplanes used to transport the Japanese prime minister and the imperial 
family were tracked online on flightradar24, therefore the ministry of defense of Japan 
asked the heads of the website to remove the information[79]. This attack affects the con-
fidentiality of ADS-B.  
Target: air-ground segment.  
Attack Technique: Interception of ADS-B OUT. 
Technical Difficulty: Low [7]. The Figure 7 shows the steps followed by an attacker to 
execute aircraft reconnaissance attack. The level of difficulty is low due to many open 
source software and hardware available to execute the attack [71]. In addition, placing the 
receiver at a correct position allows the attacker to have a larger range to acquire the sig-
nals of the aircrafts.  
Impact: The attack does not produce any direct impact to the aviation system. However, it 
provides a means to gather information for economic intelligence [58]. Moreover, It can 
be used to gather relevant information of military aircrafts of an enemy state as it was stat-
ed by Cenciotti [80], and a means to gather information by terrorists which plan to execute 
a deliberate attack against a specific plane. The main concern in aviation is the loss of pri-
vacy with the interception of ADS-B OUT signals. The aviation experts were not consult-
ed about this attack because it does not have any direct impact on the operators of the sys-
tem.  
4.1.2 Aircraft Target Ghost Inject 
The attack aims to inject a ghost airplane into the cockpit display of traffic information 
(CDTI). The aircraft does not possess a mechanism to verify the authenticity of the infor-
mation, but the necessity to have proximity to the aircraft increases the difficulty [7]. To 
make it more realistic the information provided with the injection must contain all the spe-
cific data characteristics that a real airplane broadcasts through data link. The attack af-
fects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of ADS-B. 
 
Figure 7. Aircraft Reconnaissance Attack Tree. 
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Target: Air segment. 
Attack Technique: Message injection and interception of ADS-B OUT. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium-High [7]. For this attack, it is initially important to set up 
the equipment in order to eavesdrop and to identify the aircraft target. Figure 8 shows that 
for this attack it is important to set the correct format of ADS-B message and to inject an 
aircraft with credible data so that the receiver cannot detect the “ghost aircraft” as fake.  
Impact: Table 4 shows the classification of the attack considered by the aviation experts. 
Three out of five of the consulted pilots classified the attack with a severity of four. The 
main reason was the slight increase of workload while trying to identify by other means a 
possible real aircraft, which may interfere with the trajectory. The pilots, who rated the 
severity as three, considered the closeness of the ghost aircraft and the unnecessary ma-
neuvers that have to be done, if the injection is in a proximity to their airplane.  
Analysis by aviation experts: The most critical situation of this kind of attack determined 
by the participants was that an aircraft might be injected into the CDTI and the ghost air-
 
Figure 8. Aircraft Target Ghost Inject Attack Tree. 
Table 4. Classification of Aircraft Target Ghost Inject attack impact by aviation 
experts. 
Participant Severity 
PILOT 3 
PILOT 4 
PILOT 3 
PILOT 4 
PILOT 4 
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plane is addressing directly to the aircraft that the pilot controls. This situation may bring 
about doubts and immediate reactions by the pilot, even more if the pilot is flying in IFR 
conditions. The reaction of the pilot in this situation depends on the phase of the flight: 
take off, cruise or approach, being approach the most critical because the pilots could 
make an abrupt maneuver close to the terrain.  
ADS-B system may be connected with the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
and the signal of the ghost airplane could activate the TCAS alarm if the ghost airplane is 
approaching to a real aircraft such as in an opposite direction and to the same altitude. A 
participant stated: “That creates safety concerns because of the high trust that pilots have 
on the instruments. We are trained to follow the indications of the instruments as if they 
were completely right. Therefore, if there is an injection and that activates my TCAS 
alarm, I would follow immediately the indications of the TCAS”. 
Moreover, if the attack is recurrent and the aircraft is flying in a RVSM airspace, the pilot 
might be forced to turn off the TCAS and to change the altitude, or in the worst case to 
operate the aircraft without TCAS, situation that might pose additional safety concerns. 
However, the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) allows to operate the aircraft up to 10 days 
according to the Eurocontrol [81]. The MEL may vary according to the regulations of eve-
ry country or manufacturer, and in some cases it could be very restrictive that the aircraft 
must be on the ground immediately the same day of the event.  
One participant considered the injection of a ghost airplane on the runway while his air-
plane is on approach. Such event would activate the alert of collision avoidance and hence 
the aircraft will be forced to make a go-around in a situation which is not needed. Alt-
hough, the injections of many aircrafts on the CDTI would make the pilot to think that 
there is an error of the system, the availability of the system would be compromised be-
cause the pilot cannot trust anymore in the information displayed on the CDTI. 
Mitigations:  
If there is enough time to verify the traffic: 
a. Verify traffic with ATC and other aircrafts using radio communications. 
b. Confirm visually the traffic if the visibility allows to do that. 
If there is not time 
a. Follow immediately the indications of TCAS resolution advisory to avoid any pos-
sible mid-air collision. 
4.1.3 Ground Station Target Ghost Inject 
The attack injects a single “ghost aircraft” in the ground station of the air traffic control. It 
is required the ability to create a 112 bit-message that has the characteristics of a legiti-
mate traffic in the screen of the air traffic controller [7]. In addition, the attack must com-
ply with the required information that an aircraft broadcasts at a rate of 2Hz. Therefore, 
the attacker must know the proper data contained in an ADS-B message for legitimate 
flights in order to create the ghost aircraft. The attack affects the integrity of ADS-B. 
Target: Ground segment and air ground-segment. 
Attack Technique: Message injection. 
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Technical Difficulty: Medium-High [7]. Figure 9 shows the process to execute the attack. 
It is important to note that an attacker needs to have special knowledge of the ground sta-
tion equipment. This knowledge provides the attacker with the ability to set the specific 
software and hardware to break the security of the air traffic control.  
Impact: Table 5 shows the classification of the attack considered by the aviation experts 
in ATC. Four out of five of the interviewees classified the attack with a severity of four. 
The main reason was the significant increase in the air traffic control workload while try-
ing to identify the ghost aircraft using other means. One air traffic controller classified the 
attack with a severity of three due to the possible reduction in separation in the case that 
another aircraft is ordered to avoid a conflict with the ghost airplane. 
Analysis of aviation experts: The general perception of the participants was that an injec-
tion of a single aircraft ghost airplane does not represent a problem for the air traffic con-
trol. Some of them recalled that there are many aircrafts which do not identify themselves, 
and it is not possible to confirm the real information of that aircraft.  
However, two air traffic controllers expressed the concern that the injection of the aircraft 
could be in a terminal area TMA. In that case, the injection could affect the normal proce-
dures of the approach. They remembered past experiences of a phenomenon called “gar-
bling”. Garbling is an error presented in SSR when the signals of two aircrafts overlap and 
then they make the collision avoidance systems detect a close proximity to another air-
craft. It means, for instance that the aircraft could be injected in the holding pattern in the 
radar screen. Therefore, it should generate an alert or modification on the radar display, 
causing to order unnecessary maneuvers to the aircrafts to avoid the ghost airplane, and 
delays in the procedures to land and take off. 
Mitigations: 
a. Vectorization of other airplanes in order to avoid any conflict with the trajectories 
until the injected airplane is identified as such and the verification with a less accu-
rate surveillance system. 
 
Figure 9. Ground Station Target Ghost Inject Attack Tree. 
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b. Correlation with a legal flight plan and transponder code. This would eliminate at 
least the doubt if it is a legal airplane or in other case a possible infringement and 
that would give the hint to identify it as a ghost aircraft. 
c. Transmission of instructions to the aircraft to confirm if it can follow the orders 
and information to other aircrafts about the “ghost traffic” in case it might be real. 
d. If none of the previous procedures is satisfied then it must be started an intercep-
tion mission by the military aviation. 
4.1.4 Ground Station Multiple Ghost Inject 
This attack is performed using the same technique of ground station target ghost inject 
attack, but the attacker must increase the bandwidth according to the number of aircrafts 
that wants to inject [57]. In 2012 at the Defcon Hacking Conference [82], [83] it was 
proven that as many as 50 ghost aircrafts can be injected on the display of an air traffic 
controller and generate the correct ADS-B data broadcast. The attack affects the integrity 
and availability of ADS-B. 
Target: Ground segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Message injection. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium-High [7]. The attack tree in figure 10 depicts an additional 
node that increases the difficulty of the attack, since the bandwidth has to be considerable 
to inject a sufficient number of ghost planes in order to create enough confusion in ATC.  
Impact: Table 6 shows the classification of the attack determined by the aviation experts 
in ATC. Four out of five of the interviewees classified the attack with a severity of three. 
The main reason was the significant reduction in separation caused by the confusion of 
having a considerable number of ghost airplanes. Situation that might lead to take wrong 
decisions in the air traffic control. The ATM expert classified the attack with a severity of 
four, since the participant considered that the degradation to another surveillance system 
could solve the problem rapidly. 
Analysis of aviation experts: The general perception of the participants was that this at-
tack might be critical if the degradation to a less accurate surveillance system cannot be 
executed immediately. Moreover, in the event that this attack might happened, the confu-
sion caused in the moment of the attack might can be simply solved with the degradation 
to a less accurate surveillance system such as PSR or MLAT. The congestion would be 
Table 5. Classification of Ground Station Target Ghost Inject attack impact by aviation 
experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 4 
ATC 4 
ATC 3 
ATC 4 
ATC 4 
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generated due to the extension of separation that has to be applied to the aircrafts based on 
each surveillance system, causing problems with the normal flow of the air traffic. That 
would consequently cause more workload to the air traffic controllers.  
The participants shared the same thought when they were asked about the number of air-
planes they could handle. A participant noted: “There are tools for the Air Traffic Flow 
Management. They can determine the capacity and number of aircrafts which can be con-
trolled in that area per hour and it depends on the type of airport as well. For instance, if 
the airport has parallel runways or a single runway”. However, when the injection of mul-
tiple airplanes is so evident, then they prefer to change to another surveillance system or to 
start conventional control. 
A participant expert in air traffic management stated: “It is possible that the amount of 
injections can overload the system due to the limits of capacity of itself. The system re-
ceives and verifies all the information from the airplanes, and then in that case there could 
be loss of the display in the ATC”. The participant also added that with the current struc-
ture of the surveillance system, the injection of the ghost airplanes can be executed easily 
in the ADS-B receivers but not in the receivers of PSR, SSR or MLAT with the same ease. 
However, with the correlation with other surveillance systems the ghost airplanes can be 
 
Figure 10. Ground Station Target Ghost Inject Attack Tree. 
Table 6. Classification of Ground Station Multiple Ghost Inject attack impact by 
aviation experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 4 
ATC 3 
ATC 3 
ATC 3 
ATC 3 
 
31 
 
filtered.  
One air traffic controller stated his doubts about the attack with the current but not the fu-
ture operation of the system: “Currently the priority of the systems in our airspace is: first 
SSR, then Multilateration and finally ADS-B, there is always redundancy with the systems 
even with the elimination of SSR and PSR we can have MLAT”. 
Mitigations: 
a. Immediate degradation to a less accurate surveillance system. Start a conventional 
control to apply the standard separation according to the surveillance system which 
will be used. 
b. Divide the airspace in order to split the workload in more air traffic controllers. 
c. Start deviation of aircrafts to holding patterns and alternate airports in order to re-
duce congestion in the terminal area of the air space. 
4.1.5 Replay Attack 
The attack aims to send information of a previous flying aircraft to broadcast it again to 
the ATC. The attack requires to capture ADS-B OUT signals on 1090MHz frequency and 
to adjust the transmitter to replay the captured data using the proper file to transmit the file 
of captured data via GNU Radio hardware [10]. The attack affects the confidentiality and 
integrity of ADS-B. 
Target: Ground segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Message injection and interception of ADS-B OUT. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium [10]. The attack tree in Figure 11 exhibits that the attacker 
has to perform additional steps for the message injection. The attacker must intercept and 
capture the data and finally to replay the captured messages making use of message injec-
tion. 
Impact: Table 7 shows the classification of the replay attack determined by the aviation 
experts in ATC. Three out of five of the interviewees classified the attack with a severity 
 
Figure 11. Replay Attack Tree. 
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of four, stating that the attack is easy to detect and it will just slightly increase the work-
load of the air traffic controller. Two participants classified the attack with a severity of 
four. They support their classification noting that it might cause to deviate aircrafts and 
reduction in the separation. Even though they can identify the fake aircrafts, they would 
not take the risk with real airplanes in conflict with the ghost airplanes. 
Analysis of aviation experts: The participants considered that it is an easily detectable 
attack due to the wrong correlation of the flight plan, transponder code or identifier with 
the origin flight. The information can be confirmed with the air navigation service provid-
er (ANSP) or airlines. One air traffic controller stated: “The airlines have scheduled flights 
and it would be just so evident if the information of a previous flight is replayed”. The 
verification with radio communications and the deviation of other aircrafts would solve 
any conflict with the replayed ghost aircraft. If the aircraft does not have a correlated flight 
plan then it is shown with a different color on the screen and can be easily identified by 
the air traffic controllers.  
It was also considered by the participants that there could be possible collision avoidance 
alert if the replayed aircraft is in the trajectory of another plane. One air traffic controller 
stated: “There are two systems which help to avoid collisions or at least to alert to air traf-
fic controllers. STCA Short Term Conflict Alert and MTCD Medium-Term Conflict Alert 
advise to an air traffic controller if the ghost aircraft could be converging with a real air-
craft:” Therefore, keeping the other aircrafts out of the trajectory is enough to manage the 
traffic in the case that the replayed aircraft cannot be identified as fake. The attack would 
just create confusion but it can be handled with no further consequences.  
Mitigations: 
a. Try to establish radio communication with the aircraft. 
b. Verify correlation with flight plan, transponder code, aircraft information with the 
airline and to confirm flight information with the previous airspace where the air-
craft is coming from. 
c. Use Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) and Medium-Term Conflict Alert systems 
(MTCD) to receive alerts of a possible collision and to keep other aircrafts out of 
converged trajectories in order to avoid any conflict.  
Table 7. Classification of Replay Attack attack impact by aviation experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 5 
ATC 4 
ATC 5 
ATC 4 
ATC 5 
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4.1.6 Aircraft Spoofing 
The attack is achieved by the combination of message injection and message deletion [57]. 
The attacker must to eavesdrop the 1090MHz channel in order to interpret the messages 
and to interfere with the required message [52]. The attack is useful to reduce the propen-
sity of alarms when an attacker disguises as a legal aircraft [44]. The attack affects the 
confidentiality and integrity of ADS-B. 
Target: Ground segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Message Deletion, message injection and interception of ADS-OUT. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium [10],[57],[53]. Although the attack was classified as medi-
um, it requires a combination of techniques that must be executed with a proper coordina-
tion. Figure 12 illustrates the required procedures that an attacker must to execute and the 
two options that an attacker has in order to delete a selected message. 
Impact: Table 8 shows the classification of aircraft spoofing attack determined by the 
aviation experts in ATC. All five participants determine that the level of severity is five, 
since the attack would only slightly increase the workload of the air traffic controllers 
without any additional consequence.  
Analysis of aviation experts: There is not standard procedure for this kind of attack and it 
could not cause a critical situation. The participants proposed the same solution to the 
problem. The information of the aircraft would be verified with the flight plan, transpond-
er code, time of departure, and communication with the controller of the previous air 
space, airline or the air navigation service provider where the aircraft is proceeding from. 
For most of the participants, it was unlikely that an aircraft would try to deceive the air 
traffic control. One air traffic controller stated: “it would be just easier to not transmit with 
ADS-B transponder or to jam the 1090Mhz channel”. The aircraft would be detected as 
illegal if it is not following the instructions of ATC. 
Moreover, one air traffic controller said: “The procedure is standardized to be that way, 
and the air traffic controller is always transferring the traffic to the next air traffic control-
ler who manages the next air airspace. Although in some areas with no strict control, the 
crew could just pretend to be a legal airplane and continue with their flight”. 
Table 8. Classification of Aircraft Spoofing attack impact by aviation experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 5 
ATC 5 
ATC 5 
ATC 5 
ATC 5 
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Mitigations: 
a. Try to establish radio communications with the aircraft. 
b. Verify correlation with flight plan, transponder code, aircraft route and information 
with the controller of the previous air the airplane is proceeding from. 
c. Confirm that aircraft follows instructions from ATC. 
d. If the airplane does not comply with the previous requirements, start interception 
procedure with military aviation. 
4.1.7 Virtual Trajectory Modification 
The objective of the attack is to modify the trajectory of an aircraft in flight [52]. The at-
tack can be achieved making use of combination of techniques. The first combination is to 
do message deletion and message injection and the second option is to modify directly the 
broadcast message by the aircraft while is being transmitted [44]. The attack affects the 
confidentiality and integrity of ADS-B. 
Target: Ground segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Message deletion and message injection, or message modification. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium [57]. Figure 13 shows that the attack requires a combina-
tion of techniques to be performed. Therefore, the difficulty is increased and the attacker 
must have the ability to be precise while executing the required procedures.  
 
Figure 12. Aircraft Spoofing Attack Tree. 
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Impact: Table 9 shows the classification of the attack determined by the aviation experts 
in ATC. Three out of five of the participants classified the attack with a severity of three. 
The reason for this classification is that the air traffic controller takes decisions of 
reduction of separation between aircrafts based on the location of the aircraft on the 
screen. Therefore, it could be evidenced a significant reduction in separation between two 
aircrafts that is out of the standard. Two participants classified the attack with a severity of 
four, stating that the workload would only be increased due to the increment in communi-
cations with the crew, since they cannot trust anymore in the position of the screen 
Analysis of aviation experts: The perception of the participants was that it would be a 
problem if the attack cannot be detected. However, it would not be critical as long as the 
information of the real position of the aircraft can be confirmed with the crew. Another 
participant said that if he can identify the attack then he would not trust in ADS-B any-
more and would use conventional control to solve any conflict of aircrafts, or to rely only 
in another less accurate surveillance system. 
Table 9. Classification of Virtual Trajectory Modification attack impact by aviation 
experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 4 
ATC 3 
ATC 3 
ATC 4 
ATC 3 
 
 
Figure 13. Virtual Trajectory Modification Attack Tree. 
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An air traffic controller gave an example of a critical situation with a possible reduction of 
the separation of the aircrafts, because the air traffic controller gives instructions based on 
the actual position that he can see on the screen. Therefore, in IFR or on approach, the 
reduction could represent a safety concern or possible mid-air collision and at the same 
time, it will increase the workload of the air traffic controller. 
A participant noted that the most and scariest situation is if the modification of the trajec-
tories of all the aircrafts occurred at the same time. He gives an example calling the phe-
nomenon as “if the radar freezes”, then the traces of aircrafts do not move and it could take 
long time for the air traffic controller to understand what is happening, while the aircrafts 
are still moving without the control of ATC.  
Mitigations: 
a. If detected, the real position of the aircraft must be verified with the crew. 
b. Stop trusting in the information received by ADS-B system and start a convention-
al control to give vectors to the aircraft. 
c. Use an alternate surveillance system if possible to have improved reports of the po-
sition of the aircraft and to avoid any conflict. 
4.1.8 Aircraft Disappearance 
The attacker aims to delete all the ADS-B messages that the aircraft broadcast to ground 
station or to another aircraft [57]. The attack might delete not only one but many selected 
aircrafts by the attacker. The attack affects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
ADS-B. 
Attack Target: Ground segment, air-ground segment and air segment. 
Attack Technique: Message deletion. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium [57]. The attack represents certain level of difficulty, since 
the synchronization and timing are the key to delete the desired message [57]. Therefore, 
the attacker needs to eavesdrop the channel and interpret the messages before starting the 
attack. Figure 14 shows the combination of interception of ADS-OUT signals and message 
 
Figure 14. Aircraft Disappearance Attack Tree. 
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deletion to perform aircraft disappearance attack.  
Impact: Aviation experts in air traffic control classified the attack with a severity of two. 
They expressed the concern that with the disappearance of one or more aircrafts from the 
radar screen, the loss of air traffic control for a long period could be critical and that might 
cause large reduction in the separation of the airplanes. Table 10 shows the classification 
by the ATM expert and air traffic controllers.  
The pilots rated the attack as four level of severity as it is shown in Table 11. The main 
reason is that the attack would increase the workload due to the loss of situational aware-
ness related with the traffic around the aircraft they fly.  
Analysis of aviation experts: The attack was identified by most of the participants as 
highly dangerous. One participant said that the air traffic controller might forget that there 
was an airplane there, and in some cases the next radio communication with the crew 
could take long time. The disappearance of one aircraft could lead to a conflict that the 
STCA and MTCD would not alert to air traffic controllers. A participant stated special 
concern to this attack saying: “10 or 15 minutes without seeing an aircraft could lead to an 
accident”. The problem might be more critical if it is in a congested air space, and it might 
be easy to forget about two or more aircrafts which disappear from the ATC radar screen. 
If the attack is noticed by the air traffic controller the solution is straightforward, it would 
only be necessary to give priority and to establish conventional control to that aircraft.  
Table 10. Classification of Aircraft Disappearance attack impact by aviation experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 2 
ATC 2 
ATC 2 
ATC 2 
ATC 2 
 
Table 11. Classification of Aircraft Disappearance attack impact by pilots. 
Participant Severity 
PILOT 4 
PILOT 4 
PILOT 4 
PILOT 4 
PILOT 4 
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The pilots determined that the disappearance of one aircraft can be detectable easily be-
cause there is a constant crossed check to the CDTI throughout all the flight. A participant 
considered that it is a critical problem in a congested airspace because there is a loss of 
situational awareness of the aircrafts around his airplane. Moreover, without those signals, 
the TCAS would not generate the respective alerts to instruct the pilots how to respond for 
a collision avoidance.  
Mitigations for ATC: 
a. Use mechanisms of prediction of trajectory for ADS-B so that the predicted trajec-
tory is shown on the screen in the case that the aircraft disappears. 
If the disappearance of the aircraft is detected: 
b. Request position of the crew and establish conventional control.  
c. Transmit vectors to the crew in order to give priority to the aircraft. 
Mitigations for Pilots: 
a. If the disappearance is detected: Inform immediately to air traffic control about the 
loss of an aircraft from the CDTI. 
b. Verify correct operation of the equipment on board. 
c. Increase situational awareness by using visual search methods and radio communi-
cations to verify the position of the disappeared aircraft. 
4.1.9 False Alarm Attack 
ADS-B transponders have a mode to indicate de current status of the aircraft. For instance, 
the pilot can set a status of emergency or hijacked aircraft, information which is transmit-
ted to the ATC ground station. The attack executes similar steps to virtual trajectory modi-
fication attack because the attacker has the options to delete and inject messages or just to 
modify the messages [52]. The purpose of the attack is to create a false alarm on the ATC 
 
Figure 15. False Alarm Attack Tree. 
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which has not been set by the crew of the respective aircraft. The attack affects the confi-
dentiality and integrity of ADS-B. 
Target: Ground segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Message deletion, message injection and message modification. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium [57]. Figure 15 exhibits the combination of various tech-
niques for executing false alarm attack. The attack tree shows the options that the attacker 
can choose after doing aircraft reconnaissance in order to identify the desired target.  
Impact: Aviation experts in air traffic control classified the attack with a severity of four. 
The participants stated the same considerations. The increase in the air traffic controller 
workload would be caused due to the additional procedures that have to be followed in 
accordance to the regulations for each kind of alarm. They have to be followed even 
though the alarm is false. Table 12 shows the classification by ATM expert and air traffic 
controllers.  
Analysis by aviation experts 
It was determined by all the participants that the attack would not cause any critical situa-
tion but it would create safety concerns if the code is of a hijacked aircraft or aircraft 
emergency, and consequently that will increase the workload of the air traffic controller in 
an unnecessary task. A participant stated: “I would consider that many false alarms on 
different airplanes not only create confusion but also would draw the attention of the air 
traffic controller in tasks that are not needed at the moment”. It was also considered that 
radio communications with the crew will solve the problem, but in the case of a hijacked 
airplane the ATC cannot trust in the crew. 
Mitigations:  
a. Follow the standard procedures given in the Document 4444 by ICAO [84] in the 
case of an emergency code such as 7700, 7600 and 7500. 
b.  If there is not radio communication with the aircraft, it is needed to confirm with 
the airline the real status of the airplane. 
c.  The same procedure applies if the aircraft has a hijacked code, and it is not possi-
ble to trust in the crew.  
Table 12. Classification of False Alarm Attack attack impact by aviation experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 4 
ATC 4 
ATC 4 
ATC 4 
ATC 4 
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4.1.10  Aircraft Flood Denial 
The attack has the main objective to jam the 1090 MHz channel or the GPS signals which 
are transmitting the information to the aircraft. It would cause the denial of service of 
ADS-B system that provides surveillance information to the aircraft. As noted by 
McCallie [7] the difficulty of the attack is determined based on the proximity that an at-
tacker has to have to the aircraft. Therefore, a state sponsored attacker is the only one who 
might have the airborne equipment to approach in the air to a high altitude flying aircraft, 
for example a drone or a military aircraft with such capabilities [52]. The other attackers 
have the opportunity to jam the signals of an approaching or on the ground aircraft since 
they can have easy access to the facilities of an airport [57]. The attack affects the availa-
bility of ADS-B 
Target: Air segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Jamming that disrupts 1090 MHz channel or GPS signals. 
Technical Difficulty: Medium [7]. The steps considered for this attack (Figure 16) require 
jamming and the correct identification of the aircraft making use of aircraft reconnais-
sance.  
Impact: Table 13 shows the classification of the attack made by the consulted pilots. The 
attack represents a real problem for the pilots as it can be evidenced in the similarity of the 
responses and the classification of the impact severity of the attack with a level of 3. 
Analysis by aviation experts: The participants agreed that the attack raises safety con-
cerns in congested air spaces and adversarial weather conditions, since the traffic is high 
and there is more probability of mid-air collisions. Providing information of the problem 
to the ATC will help to increase the situational awareness of air traffic controllers as well. 
All the participants stated that this attack could cause a possible mid-air collision because 
there is a loss of situational awareness about the traffic which is around the plane. Moreo-
ver, the loss of the traffic from the CDTI cause that the pilots do not have the ability to 
prevent a possible TCAS alarm with enough time in advance. It might be possible that 
TCAS uses ADS-B signals and therefore the system works with the reception of the sig-
nals of two aircrafts simultaneously. That means that while receiving the signals from only 
 
Figure 16. Aircraft Flood Denial Attack Tree. 
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one airplane, the system would not give any advisory resolution to any crew. 
The general perception was a real safety issue which can be manageable by the pilots with 
the radio communications with ATC and other aircrafts. However, they would be limited 
to the information of the ATC because of the loss of safety elements such as the ADS-B 
and TCAS.  
Mitigations: 
a. Inform to ATC about the issue in order to confirm if the position of the aircraft is 
still displayed on the ATC radar screen. 
b. Increase situational awareness on radio communications to be aware of the other 
nearby aircrafts. 
c. Follow the instructions according to MEL for the maintenance of the aircraft. 
4.1.11  Ground Station Flood Denial 
The attack is executed with the same technique as for the aircraft flood denial attack. The 
attacker must get proximity to the ground station in order to emit jamming signals that 
disrupt completely ADS-B transmission and reception in the 1090 MHz frequency [7]. 
The attack affects the availability of ADS-B. 
 
Figure 17. Ground Station Flood Denial Attack Tree. 
Table 13. Classification of Aircraft Flood Denial attack impact by aviation experts. 
Participant Severity 
PILOT 3 
PILOT 3 
PILOT 3 
PILOT 3 
PILOT 3 
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Target: Ground segment and air-ground segment. 
Attack Technique: Jamming that disrupts 1090 MHz channel or GPS signals 
Technical Difficulty: Low [7]. Figure 17 depicts the straightforward steps that can be 
followed by an attacker and that confirms the low classification that cyber security experts 
give to this attack.  
Impact: The classification made by the air traffic controllers considered the real loss of all 
the aircrafts shown on the screen (Table 14). The aviation experts classified the severity as 
level two, demonstrating that this attack might cause significant reduction of separation 
between aircrafts.  
Analysis of aviation experts: The participants consider that losing the aircrafts from the 
radar screen might be a critical situation only if the air space is congested. The conven-
tional control would help but there could be conflicts if the standard separation of the air-
planes is reduced. An air traffic controller stated: “The loss of situational awareness is big; 
I would not remember where all the aircrafts were”. The reorganization of the air space 
could take time and the capacity of the airspace is reduced, which will force many aircrafts 
to be diverted to alternate airports.  
Mitigations: 
a. Switch to a less accurate surveillance system and reduce the capacity of the air-
space. 
b. Inform to all the aircrafts of the air space about the problem in order to alert them 
and to increase the situational awareness of the crews. 
c. Divide the air space with other air traffic controller and extend the separation with 
aircrafts to reduce the probability of a mid-air collision. 
d. Start conventional control to send the airplanes to holding patterns or alternate air-
ports in order to reduce the congestion. 
4.2 Dynamic Analysis of Cyber Attacks against ADS-B 
To complement the analysis it is important to assess the attacks based on a scenario-based 
approach as it is stated by McCallie [7]. However, the countless scenarios derived by 
many additional factors such as adverse meteorology conditions, amount of air traffic, 
Table 14. Classification of Ground Station Flood Denial attack impact by aviation 
experts. 
Participant Severity 
ATM expert 2 
ATC 2 
ATC 2 
ATC 2 
ATC 2 
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failures in other type of communications or emergencies in the aircraft, and that may occur 
in aviation due to the complexity of the system, will always limit the analysis. Therefore, 
the attacks are dynamically analyzed based on the threat model described in section 4.2.1 
and the average impact results given by the aviation experts which are summarized in Ta-
ble 15 from the most severe to the least severe attack.  
4.2.1 Threat Model 
A threat model is considered to focus the study in the main intentions of the attacker and 
to analyze the impact on the mission of aviation based on the results of the interviews. It 
was taking into consideration that the means to affect a safety critical infrastructure such 
as aviation, is not anymore only physical, but also cyber-physical, the integration and con-
trolled coordination between on-board and off-board systems [85], and the transition from 
analog to digital communications in aviation [70], which are creating new possibilities for 
cyber attackers. The attackers are categorized based on the main objective that each at-
tacker aims to achieve. The adversaries were categorized and analyzed as follows: 
a. “Script Kiddies”: this kind of attacker aims to execute actions with readily availa-
ble software and hardware in the public market. Although the capabilities of script kiddies 
cannot be exactly defined, they can also perform attacks at different levels of difficulty if 
they can count with sensible information of the aeronautical network and operations. The 
main intention of the attacker is to cause confusion or annoyance to the air navigation traf-
fic management. 
Table 15. Average severity of impact of attacks 
Attacks Severity of Impact Average 
Ground Station Flood Denial 2 
Aircraft Disappearance ATC 2 
Virtual Trajectory Modification 3 
Aircraft Flood Denial 3 
Ground Station Multiple Ghost Inject 3 
Aircraft Target Ghost Inject 4 
Aircraft Disappearance PILOT 4 
Ground Station Target Ghost Inject 4 
False Alarm Attack 4 
Replay Attack 5 
Aircraft Spoofing 5 
Aircraft Reconnaissance None 
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Due to the availability of software tools such as software-defined radios (SDR), the script 
kiddies might execute any of the attacks analyzed on this thesis. The attacks might create 
confusion in the air traffic control or in the cockpit, if the attacker is in close proximity to 
an airplane. The attacks could become safety concerns into incidents as it is evidenced in 
the results given by aviation experts. However, the capacities to create an impact of large 
scale surpass the capabilities of this kind of attacker. 
b. Cyber Criminals: category is divided into two groups according to the intention 
to better analyze the objectives of a criminal. This kind of attacker possesses quite consid-
erable capabilities to cause an extensive impact on the system, also the equipment used is 
more complex in order to achieve the proposed effect.   
- Economic purpose attacker: the attacker has as main objective to obtain an eco-
nomic gain by means of cyber-attacks on ADS-B infrastructure.  
An attacker who aims to get any profitable gain might use aircraft reconnaissance to gath-
er information in order to make economic intelligence. In addition, the attacks against a 
specific aircraft such as aircraft target ghost inject and aircraft flood denial can be used to 
create safety concerns, related with the proper function of the CDTI display of the air-
plane, in the pilots and maintenance personnel. That would force to make an annotation on 
the book of the aircraft that might lead to ground the airplane. The economic gain is evi-
denced in the airlines and manufacturers that are competitors of the affected company. 
Another consideration is related with other type of criminal such as smugglers or drug 
traffickers. These criminals can use ground station ghost inject attack to have the ability to 
divert the attention of the authorities to a ghost airplane while at the same time an illegal 
aircraft is using another trajectory to reach a desired destination. The event can only be 
considered in a Non-Radar Area (NRA). 
- Terrorist attacker: the attacker has as main objective to create chaos and massive 
death of people to create fear. Aviation has been used for criminals to execute ter-
rorist attacks such as the events on September 11 of 2001 and the long list of hi-
jacked aircrafts in aviation history. 
To create a huge chaos the terrorist attackers might use ground station multiple ghost in-
ject, aircraft disappearance and ground station flood denial. These attacks were rated by 
the aviation experts as those that can cause the most severe impact in aviation system. 
Those attacks can create lots of confusion, which can lead to mid-air collisions and con-
flicts, but the certainty to achieve an accident is far from the capacities that a cyber attack 
might provide as it can be evidenced in the results of chapter 4. However, a special con-
sideration is the use of aircraft reconnaissance to track commercial aircrafts, and use it as a 
tool to improve the efficiency to target a specific airplane with military weaponry. 
c. State sponsored attackers: the category is divided into two groups according to 
the specific intention that the state wants to achieve at a high level. The attacker counts 
with specialized and military equipment to cause large-scale damage in ADS-B system 
and air navigation. 
- Cyberwarfare attacker: the main intention of the attacker is to create cyber-
attacks against ADS-B system with political motivations in order to affect financial 
stability of the target state.  
The attacks can be executed massively since this kind of attacker can use tools that are 
more sophisticated. For instance, to create a large impact in the economy of a country it is 
useful to use ground station flood denial in many airports in the target country. The same 
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way as the massive attack using aircraft target disappearance to create conflicts in the most 
congested air spaces of the target and to make the biggest economic impact due to the de-
lays and ground of many flights. The other attacks do not represent a real problem since 
the impact evaluated by the aviation experts would not cause the necessary damage in-
tended by this kind of attacker. 
- Military attacker: the main objective of the attacker is to execute attacks with 
high level equipment such as jammers, software, hardware and additional military 
weaponry to obtain a military advantage.  
In order to gain any military advantage, aircraft reconnaissance plays a key role to identify 
those military airplanes, which are using ADS-B system without encryption. Moreover, 
the massive jamming on ground stations of the system would force to the enemy to use 
less accurate surveillance system. For that purpose, the ground station flood denial attack 
might be ideal to create the desired impact. With the advanced tools that a state sponsored 
attacker can use, the aircraft flood denial can be used to jam the signals not only of ADS-
B, but also GPS of an aircraft, creating difficulties for military airplanes to execute high 
accuracy approaches while using the capabilities of ADS-B and GPS. 
In a military context, the use of ground station multiple ghost inject can be used to create 
confusion to the enemy. The injection of multiple airplanes can deviate the attention to 
other areas to make a trap and to carry out an attack in a different target. Although this 
confusion can be neutralized with the use of a primary radar, with the elimination of pri-
mary radars around the world that might be a vulnerability. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations  
5.1 Conclusions 
This thesis accumulates the information and knowledge obtained from the academic, 
hackers and aviation communities to systematically analyze the cyber-attacks against 
ADS-B and to determine the possible impact that these threats can cause to aviation. For 
the purpose of the analysis, aviation experts were consulted in regards to the topic to get 
an approach to the truth, the safety impact of the attacks and the mitigations that can be 
executed by controllers and pilots to cope in this kind of situations. In this thesis, a 
different threat model was considered in order to make a dynamic analysis of the cyber-
attacks and the possible intentions of the attackers. It was taking into consideration that the 
means to affect a safety critical infrastructure, such as aviation, are not anymore only 
physical, but also cyber-physical due to the availability of open source software-defined 
radios that are creating new possibilities for cyber attackers.  
The findings of this thesis have identified the lack of awareness of aviation experts about 
the vulnerabilities of ADS-B. It was determined that the experience and the capacitation 
that aviation personnel have could be an important factor to deal with a cyber-attack. The 
study identified that the common effect caused by the attacks in air traffic controllers is the 
increment of workload. The attacks could be dangerous depending on the level of 
congestion of the airspace, the magnitude of the attack and the conditions in the moment 
of execution. Additionally, the results of pilots interviews considered that the attacks 
might cause loss of situational awareness and force to take unexpected decisions that 
might lead to undesirable consequences. The study identified as a concern how to identify 
a cyber-attack against ADS-B. The detection part is the most difficult for the operators of 
the system. The procedure after the detection can be executed according to the experience 
and criteria of the air traffic controllers and pilots. Therefore, the aviation professionals 
require training to identify the different cyber-attacks against ADS-B system 
The analysis classified aircraft disappearance and ground station flood denial with the 
maximum level of severity of impact among all the cyber attacks. The severity of 2 for 
these attacks was given according to OSA ED78A/DO264 classification matrix. It was 
determined that these attacks can cause enough confusion to make the air traffic 
controllers to lose situational awareness of the controlled airspace. The common factor of 
the attacks is the disappearance of one or all the aircrafts. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that disappearing is more dangerous that injecting a ghost aircraft or modifying an ADS-B 
message. 
Aircraft target ghost inject, ground station target ghost inject, false alarm attack and 
aircraft flood denial were classified with an impact severity of 3 or 4. These attacks with 
medium severity cannot cause a major effect in the aeronautical operations. The attacks 
also might be handled with the current tools and procedures that aviation experts currently 
have. On the other hand, ground station multiple ghost inject attack was assessed by all the 
ATC experts with a severity of 3. Since the increase in the workload of the air traffic 
controllers could be higher, there could be lots of confusion if the switch to other 
surveillance system is not executed immediately. In addition, an ATM expert explained 
that the attack might be mitigated with filtering procedure due to the fusion of information 
with other surveillance system; however, it was also noted that the multiple injection could 
overload the data processor system and leave the ATC without display. 
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The attacks assessed and classified with impact severity of 4 or 5 were aircraft spoofing 
and replay attack. The analysis revealed that these attacks are easy to identify and easy to 
handle due to the straightforward manner to correlate the information of the “ghost 
airplanes” with information provided by air navigation service provider or airlines. With 
the current procedures the air traffic controllers are able to deal with the attacks with no 
further consequences. 
The dynamic analysis assessed attackers with different profiles and intentions. One of the 
main intentions is to create confusion. The attackers who aim low level objectives might 
use attack techniques such as single injections or single message modifications to achieve 
a specific low level purpose. On the other hand, the high level attackers require a 
combination of cyber attacks to genreate enough confusion in aviation system, such as 
massive disappearance of aircrafts or ground station flood denial. However, based on the 
analysis the cyber-attacks do not provide the attackers with the certainty and the sufficient 
ability to cause an accident. 
5.2 Recommendations 
The main recommendation is to create awareness about the vulnerabilities of the system to 
pilots and air traffic controllers. In order to provide more capacitation to face this kind of 
events it is recommended to train aviation personnel with ATC and aircraft simulators 
with scenerios of cyber-attacks. The training would give more abilities to identify a cyber 
attack stuation and would provide knowledge of procedures that must be folllowed to 
avoid any mislead action. 
The second recommendation is to encourage aviation and information technology 
industries to work together on the discovery, research and mitigation of cyber threats. 
Experiments in real environments should be exectuted to determine the feasibility and the 
consequences of a cyber attack against ADS-B. That would allow to take the necessary 
meassures to face the attacks, instead of waiting until an accident occurs to issue new 
regulations or procedures as it has been evidenced in aviation in the aftermath of every 
accident. 
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Appendix 
Background of participants 
PARTICIPANTS 
DISCIPLINE 
EDUCATION BACKGROUND YEARS OF 
EXPERIENCE 
ADS-B 
OPERA-
TION 
ATM EXPERT Bachelor in 
Navigation and 
Surveillance 
Sytems 
Local support engineer 10 YES 
 Master's Degree, 
Telecommunicatio
ns 
Estonian Air Navigation 
Services Engineer  
Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD), 
Electrical, 
Electronics and 
Communications 
Engineering 
Head of Surveillance and 
Navigation Systems 
Subdivision Estonian Air 
Navigation Services 
ATM Expert Estonian Air 
Navigation Services 
ATC Tartu Aviation 
College degree 
Lennart Meri Airport Air 
Traffic Controller 
15 YES 
Technical Training Estonian Air Navigation 
services  
ATC Bachelor in 
Aeronautical 
Engineer 
El Dorado Airport Air Traffic 
Controller 
18 YES 
Master's Degree in 
Aviation Safety 
Aviation Safety Consultant 
ATC Bachelor in 
Aeronautical 
Engineer 
Millitary Air Traffic 
Controller 
25 YES 
Master's Degree in 
Aviation Safety 
El Dorado Airport Air Traffic 
Controller 
Aviation Safety Consultant 
ATC Bachelor in 
Aeronautical 
Engineer 
El Dorado Airport Air Traffic 
Controller 
30 YES 
Master's Degree in 
Aviation Safety  
Aviation Safety Consultant 
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PILOT Bachelor 
Aeronautical 
Administration, 
Colombian Air 
Force Academy 
Military Pilot 18 YES 
Fokker 50 Copilot/Pilot 
Airbus 320 Copilot/Pilot 
Boeing 787 Copilot/ Pilot 
PILOT Bachelor 
Aeronautical 
Administration, 
Colombian Air 
Force Academy 
Military Pilot 14 YES 
Boeing 737 Copilot/ Pilot 
Airbus 330 Copilot/Pilot 
PILOT Bachelor in 
Aeronautical 
Science, Pacific 
Aviation Academy 
Fokker 50 Copilot/Pilot 16 YES 
Airbus 320 Copilot/Pilot 
PILOT Bachelor 
Aeronautical 
Administration, 
Colombian Air 
Force Academy 
Military Pilot 15 YES 
Airbus 318 Copilot/Pilot 
PILOT Bachelor in 
Aeronautical 
Science, Pacific 
Aviation Academy 
Airbus 320 Copilot/Pilot 18 YES 
Boeing 767 Copilot/Pilot 
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Air traffic controllers questionnaire 
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS QUESTIONAIRE 
PREDICTED REACTIONS OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS TO CYBER AT-
TACKS AGAINST ADS-B SYSTEM 
Camilo Pantoja 
Section 1: Formal information of the interviewed person: 
Name of Organization:   
Position :  
Section 2: Main questionnaire: 
The current implementation of ADS-B is being carried out worldwide and there are still 
concerns related with the vulnerabilities that could be exploited through the identified 
cyber-attacks. The attacks might affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
system. The attacks against confidentiality provides to the attacker unauthorized infor-
mation. The attack against integrity modifies the information of ADS-B messages and the 
attacks against availability disrupt the access to the information of the system. 
Now we are going through the attacks which affect the confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of ADS-B. Every attack will be explained for your knowledge and then a set of 
questions will be asked for every attack. The attacks are Ground Station Target Ghost 
Inject, Ground Station Multiple Ghost Inject, Replay Attack, Aircraft Spoofing, Virtual 
Trajectory Modification, Aircraft Disappearance, False Alarm Attack and Ground Station 
Flood Denial. 
a. Do you have any standard procedure to deal with this situation? 
b. How do you believe you can cope with it? 
c. How would you rate the impact of the attack according to OSA ED78A/DO264 
classification matrix?  
d. What would be the most critical situation that the attack might cause? 
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Pilots questionnaire 
PILOTS QUESTIONAIRE 
PREDICTED REACTIONS OF PILOTS TO CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST ADS-B 
SYSTEM 
Camilo Pantoja 
Section 1: Formal information of the interviewed person: 
a. Name of Organization:   
b. Position :   
Section 2: Main questionnaire: 
The current implementation of ADS-B is being carried out worldwide and there are still 
concerns related with the vulnerabilities that could be exploited through the identified 
cyber-attacks. The attacks might affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
system. The attacks against confidentiality provides to the attacker unauthorized infor-
mation. The attack against integrity modifies the information of ADS-B messages and the 
attacks against availability disrupt the access to the information of the system. 
Now we are going through the attacks which affect the confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of ADS-B. Every attack will be explained for your knowledge and then a set of 
questions will be asked for every attack. The attacks are Aircraft Target Ghost Inject, 
Aircraft Disappearance and Aircraft Flood Denial. 
a. Do you have any standard procedure to deal with this situation? 
b. How do you believe you can cope with it ? 
c. How would you rate the impact of the attack according to OSA ED78A/DO264 
classification matrix?  
d. What would be the most critical situation that the attack might cause? 
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